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The early stage of radical innovation is characterised by uncertainty, data 
overload and often high rates of change. Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ 
view of innovation is now exacerbated by ‘hypercompetition’ (D'Aveni, 1999), 
a theory that describers the increasing rate and intensity of change in modern 
markets. In the design and strategy literature, design thinking is often 
positioned as an appropriate mediator of radical innovation in these 
circumstances, by facilitating interpretation of market uncertainties and 
moderating organisational behaviours. 
At its inception radical innovation is determined largely by the cognitive 
behaviour of the actors involved, often semi-consciously. In this study we set 
out to distinguish design thinking from analytical thinking and investigate the 
suitability of both for the effective early stage formation of radical innovation 
concepts.  Additionally, whereas design thinking literature mostly investigates 
and reports on the benefits of its application, we seek to understand where 
design thinking’s limitations lie and where it may be better replaced by other 
forms of cognition. This paper reports at an interim stage of a continuing 
study. It provides a comprehensive review of relevant literature and a 
qualitative exploration of two successful innovating SME firms. A framework 
is given for a novel experimental protocol that will be used in the next stage 
of the larger study. 
Keywords: Design thinking, radical innovation, emergent strategy, cognitive 
models, strategic decision making 
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Introduction 
Increasingly, competitive industries seek to target radical innovation as a 
route to strategic competitive advantage. But high levels of market and 
technological uncertainty, coupled with organisational complexity and 
competitive intensity mean the route to success in pursuing this radical 
agenda is far from clear. 
The knowledge base surrounding new product innovation is 
predominantly concerned with the ‘back end’ of new product development 
(NPD). According to Buxton, our knowledge system is out of balance, “…we 
must adopt an approach that inherently aspires to get the right design as 
well as get the design right. The former, which is one of the prime objectives 
of the up-front design phase, is the part that is too often absent in today’s 
practice" (Buxton, 2007 P.78). 
Successful radical innovators employ various strategies. Sometimes they 
identify new uncontested markets (W. C. Kim & Mauborgne, 2004; W. Chan 
Kim & Renée Mauborgne, 2005); or they change the meaning of existing 
markets (Verganti, 2009); or, they change the rules of competition to favour 
them and disadvantage their competitors (D'Aveni, 1999); or, they use 
combinations of all these and more. In each case they face acute 
uncertainty, even more so at the very early stages, when identifying market 
opportunities and proposing radically innovative solutions. It is uncertainty 
that chiefly characterises the early stages of radical innovation (ESRI) and 
influences the nature of strategic decision making.  Under this uncertainty 
the traditional and more dominant analytically-based models are less useful 
(Marren, 2010; Mintzberg, 1994). Further, it is not always a matter of choice 
whether to pursue radical game changing initiatives; instead in a growing 
number of markets it is a reality of survival (D'Aveni, 1999). It is with this in 
mind that the literature is calling for new research from which models and 
tools can be developed, and to help counteract our overreliance on 
analytical thinking and frameworks (W. Chan Kim & Renée Mauborgne, 
2005). An increasing number of authors now propose that design and design 
thinking are particularly suited to bring value and tractability to this 
dilemma (Kotler & Rath, 1984; Martin, 2009). 
ESRI accounts for up to 50% of the overall innovation development time 
(Smith & Reinertsen, 1991). Proficiency in ESRI is a key determinant in the 
success of firms involved in radical innovation and is the stage at which 
many of the final  characteristics of the innovation are determined (Khurana 
& Rosenthal, 1998). It is the major determinant of speed to market and 
therefore a prime source of early mover advantage over rival firms 
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(Langerak and Hultink cited in Brentani & Reid, 2012, P.73). Yet, it is poorly 
understood and there is a dearth of strategic tools to effectively manage the 
“fuzzy front end” activities.  
This paper provides an interim report on a study of the extent and 
nature of DT behaviours in radical early stage innovation decision making.   
In the following sections we describe ESRI and its theoretical base, as it 
has been thus far developed. We also identify the micro-behaviours of 
design thinking and its theoretical foundations. We set out our research 
strategy and we draw on analogy with entrepreneurship research to develop 
a research instrument. We categorise three cognitive styles of strategic 
decision making: Analytical reasoning (ANA), DT non-analytical reasoning 
(DNA), and other non-analytical reasoning behaviours (ONA). Each is 
described and defined for data-coding purposes. 
Finally, we validate the research instrument framework and sequence 
against empirical findings from interviews with a preliminary sample of 
expert innovating organisations; suggest improvements and set clear 
guidelines with which to progress our empirical investigation into ESRI.  
Research objectives and methodology 
In this paper, we draw on parallels with Sarasvathy's successful study of 
the early stages of business formation by analysis of the cognitive styles of 
expert entrepreneurs (D. Sarasvathy, 1997; D. Sarasvathy, Simon, & Lave, 
1998; Saras D. Sarasvathy, 2001; Saras D Sarasvathy, 2009; Saras D 
Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, & Wiltbank, 2001) and we propose a derivative 
methodology to help research and better understand the front end activities 
of ESRI. Using a novel research methodology, Sarasvathy empirically 
characterised key elements of entrepreneurial expertise in contrast to 
traditional  business planning approaches (Saras D Sarasvathy, et al., 2001). 
In doing so, she expanded understanding of the ‘pre-firm’ and its associated 
problem space (D. Sarasvathy, 1997). 
The overall study’s objectives are to establish the nature of design 
thinking behaviours, the extent of their use and the benefits that accrue 
from these types of behaviours. In addition, we wish to determine the 
circumstances in which they are most beneficially applied and, of equal 
importance, when they are less suited than traditional, more analytical 
approaches. We hypothesise that many ESRI activities are essentially design 
thinking in nature, even if not explicitly identified as such. Due to limited 
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literature and understanding of ESRI this qualitative study draws from a 
wide theory base and is exploratory in nature. 
The overall study encompasses three phases. 
PHASE 1: Retrace existing innovation development patterns and establish 
key elements and process sequence. 
PHASE 2: Map expert innovation process by concurrent cognitive 
experiment and establish the sequence of micro behaviours (cognitive 
approach) and their nature. Phase 2 will draw on phase 1 findings to validate 
an experimental research instrument. 
PHASE 3: Confirm the extent of the role of DT in early stage radical 
innovation.  
This paper reports on phase 1 completion. Here, we prepare guidelines 
towards a research instrument for cognitive experiment. Through phase 1 
we have conducted semi-structured interviews creating case studies of 6 
innovation events (3 separate innovation events in 2 different firms). 
Interviews were conducted using grounded theory principles (Moghaddam, 
2006). Interviewees self nominated based on their involvement and 
comprehensive knowledge of the innovation event in their organisations. 
Three separate individuals were interviewed for each innovation to ensure 
complete and accurate process mapping. Any inconsistencies were later 
revisited and corrected.   
In practice, radical innovation is a long process. Practical limitations do 
not afford a longitudinal study so our experimental protocol uses a research 
instrument that frames a hypothetical, though realistic and empirically 
validated, scenario set and problem space. The instrument will present ESRI 
scenarios with decision-making tasks designed to elicit evidence of cognitive 
styles and behaviours.  By ‘think aloud’ verbal reports we propose to 
capture cognitive responses of subjects. In this paper we offer taxonomy of 
cognitive styles for coding. Two forms of analysis will follow. Quantitative 
analysis will determine the proportional contribution of each cognitive style 
to ESRI, qualitative analysis will inductively extract principles for applying DT 
to future ESRI. This paper establishes rules by which to develop the 
experimental protocol problem set including its problem space, sequence 
and actor characterisation. From it industry specific experiments may be 
developed by adaptation of a previously reported event or creation of a 
brand new event, convincingly real.  
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Innovation typologies: Radical v. Incremental 
Radical innovation is a complex concept, often involving unstructured 
processes, surprising events, and disruptive outcomes. Innovation derives 
from the Latin word ‘innovare’ which is to renew or alter and ‘novus’, 
meaning new, fresh or young. For the average person in the street: 
Innovation is ‘doing something new’. For the scientist or engineer: 
Innovation is ‘inventing or discovering something new’. For the designer, 
business person or economist: Innovation is ‘doing something new that adds 
economic value through user adoption.  
Radical is drawn from the Latin word ‘radicalis’, meaning of-root or 
fundamental. Prefixed to innovation it implies a fundamental or root 
change. In context of business innovation it asserts a degree of change 
affected at systems level. In sum, radical innovation is a ‘change of frame’, 
“doing what we did not do before” where as incremental innovation 
‘improves within a given frame of solutions’ or “doing what we already do” 
(Norman & Verganti, 2013, P.82). Therefore radical prefixed to innovation 
demands a threshold of change beyond incremental.  
Norman and Verganti offer a ‘hill climbing’ analogy to distinguish 
between incremental and radical innovation (see  
 Figure 1);  
 
 Figure 1: The hill-climbing paradigm applied to incremental and radical innovation 
(Norman & Verganti, 2013 ,P.79) 
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[Incremental Innovation:] A given product might start off at “A.” 
Through Human-Centred Design and Design Research (HCD & DR), 
the product undergoes a series of incremental innovations, eventually 
bringing it to its maximum quality for this part of the design space, 
point “B.”  
[Radical Innovation:] To move to a different hill, one with a higher 
potential, requires radical innovation, and this comes about through 
either technology or meaning change, leading to point “C” on a larger 
hill. Note that the initial outcome is often inferior to that previously 
reached (“B”), and so HCD and DR are required to make the necessary 
incremental innovations to reach maximum potential. To make 
matters more complex, when the product is at point “C,” there is no 
way of knowing if indeed there is a superior level (“D”) or if this is an 
inferior spot in the design space. (2013 ,P.79) 
Radical innovation can be further categorised into different dimensions. 
We draw on Bessant and Tidd’s (2007) 4Ps of innovation space. Here they 
capture the two degrees of innovation, radical and incremental, along four 
dimensions; Product innovation reflects changes in products and services, 
Process innovation reflects changes in the how things are created or 
delivered, Position innovation changes in the context in which things are 
introduced, and Paradigm innovation describes changes in an underling 
organisational model. The 4Ps model offers a common platform to measure 
and compare disparate innovation types and specify their place along the 
incremental-radical continuum.  
We define radical innovation as a new product, process, position or 
paradigm that significantly alters the natural progression of a market or 
industry, to meet one or more of the following conditions of degree;  
A. Reach non-customers of an existing market space. Customers that 
otherwise would not naturally enter the market. (For further definitions see 
Kim and Mauborgne’s three tiers of non-customer (2005)) 
 
and/or 
 
B. Significantly undermine incumbents by changing the rules under which an 
existing market operates, necessarily with or without performance benefit to 
the customer. (For further reading see hypercompetition theory (D'Aveni, 
1999)) 
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The Early Stage of Radical Innovation  
Here we introduce extant literature on the topics relevant to early stage 
of radical innovation bounds, its process and sequence, and its decision 
making problem space. 
Background 
ESRI literature makes up a small part of innovation literature. The 
majority of the literature relates to later project execution and management 
issues with a relatively small portion addressing front end activities. Of those 
addressing front end activities, they typically expand on linear phase models 
focusing on ‘pre-project activities’(Smith & Reinertsen, 1991), phase 0 and 
pre-phase 0 (Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998), stage 0 (Cooper cited in J. Kim & 
Wilemon, 2002), fuzzy-front-end (FFE) (J. Kim & Wilemon, 2002; Smith & 
Reinertsen, 1991), or front end innovation (FEI).  
ESRI activities address all activities prior to NPD, where a project 
achieves ‘new product development’ status. Khurana and Rosenethal (1998) 
describe it as the episode before go/no-go decision when a business unit 
commits to funding or launches a NPD project. They expand on linear phase 
models of NPD processes so to recognise two additional phases, 'Pre-phase 
0' and 'Phase 0'. Pre-phase 0 is an ongoing, ill-defined activity, whereas 
Phase 0 concerns the preparation of a NPD project proposal for formal 
decision gate approval. Similarly, Kim and Wilemon adopt the term ‘fuzzy 
frond-end’ and define it as “the period from when an opportunity is first 
considered and when an idea is judged ready for development.” (2002, 
P.269). In this paper we draw significant contribution from De Brentani. She 
draws similar bounds but allows for a more open-ended inception point, 
describing “…the time and activity prior to an organization’s first screen of a 
new product idea.”(2012, P.70) Other important literatures and concepts 
include Cooper’s ‘Stage 0’, a poorly understood set of activities preceding 
his popular stage gate process, and Reinersten’s ‘fuzzy front-end’ portrayal 
of pre-project activities undertaken. While there is some consensus to the 
concluding point of ESRI, its start is much more unclear and currently 
without consensus.  
It is not unusual for very early activities to be acknowledged by 
contributors and yet in the same writing excluded from the investigation 
(Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998). This is normally an outcome of practical 
research constraint. An exception to this is offered by Reid and De Brentani 
‘fuzzy front end model of discontinuous innovation’ (Brentani & Reid, 2012; 
Reid & De Brentani, 2004). Here they prepare an ambitious model for study 
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into the frontiers of ESRI. They describe a start process which is bottom-up 
initiated by semi-autonomous individuals who traverse organisation 
boundaries in search of new knowledge. They bring together a number of 
complex issues including radical innovation, early stage processes and 
bounds, and key individual roles. To inform the research instrument, we 
draw on wider contributions from literature to strengthen weak points in De 
Brentani and Reid’s model, clarifying the radical innovation process and 
problem space.   
The ESRI process 
Reid and De Brentani (2004) and later De Brentani and Reid (2012) offer 
the most complete early stage radical innovation model. They distinguish a 
radical process from an incremental process by its orientation and 
sequence. Semi-autonomous activities by individuals initiate new 
information flow from the environment into the organisation. 
For incremental new products, structured problems or opportunities 
typically are laid out at the organizational level and are directed to 
individuals for information gathering. In the case of discontinuous 
innovations, however, we propose that the process works in the 
opposite direction—that is, that the timing and likelihood of 
organizational-level involvement is more likely to be at the discretion 
of individuals. (Reid & De Brentani, p. 140) 
In total, three decision-making interfaces exist and effect information 
flow through the ESRI process. A boundary interface (between individual 
and environment), a gatekeeping interface (between individual and 
organisation) and a project Interface (between organisation and specific 
project team). Transition between interfaces is controlled by a key individual 
in each case. Only at the third and final interface, the project interface does 
the route of control reverse. On achieving NPD status direction is centralised 
by appointment of project level decision makers.  
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Figure 2: (Reid & De Brentani, 2004) 
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Fundamentally ESRI is an information processing activity whereby new 
information is translated into innovation concepts and strategies (De 
Brentani and Reid, 2012, P.71). Accordingly, quality and speed of 
information flow are key determinants of process effectiveness. Quality is 
determined by communication effectiveness. The ability to encode 
information for transport, transport and decode after transport determines 
concept appropriateness and integrity. Speed determines the efficiency by 
which processing is completed and early-mover advantage. Effectiveness of 
both variables is determined in different ways at each interface. We extract 
guidelines for the research instrument by exploring each phase. 
Boundary phase variables 
The first of three phases is the point at which new information enters 
the organisation. According to De Brentani and Reid the process 
effectiveness at the boundary phase is dependent on three key variables; (1) 
Innovation attributes, (2) boundary spanner positioning both inside and 
outside the organisation and (3) ability to assimilate new information 
patterns.  
Innovation attributes pertain to levels of discontinuity between new 
information and existing organisational activity. That is, the greater the 
discontinuity, the greater the challenge in recognising its relevance in the 
first place. Discontinuous pattern recognition requires multiple waves of 
opportunity recognition prior to any action (cited in Brentani & Reid, 2012, 
p. 75). Secondly, effective boundary spanner positioning requires a broad 
and diverse networks base. Positioning beyond well established market 
linkages is an indicator of breadth. Thirdly, the individual’s ability to 
assimilate relevant information requires perception or classification of new 
information patterns. We draw on the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’. It 
states; ”the ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge is largely a 
function of prior related knowledge” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, P.128). 
Accordingly, learning is more difficult in novel domains as existing concepts 
are less richly connected. A diverse knowledge is advantageous where there 
is uncertainty in order to increase the likelihood of novel connection 
between patterns. A narrow skill focus, or capability bias, restricts 
exploration and breadth of linkages (March, 1991; Zhou & Wu, 2010).  
For our purposes variables 1 and 3 overlap, and so combine to form a 
single implication for the research instrument. In sum, there are 2 
implications for the research instrument;  
Firstly an existing knowledge set that is broad should positively promote 
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radical connections. A measurement scale will have two poles – narrow 
knowledge base v. broad knowledge base. 
 
Secondly network positioning should be broad and diverse. A measurement 
scale will have two poles - redundant (only established market networks) v 
non-redundant (broad and diverse networks). 
Gatekeeper phase variables 
The second of three phases sees the introduction of an organisation 
layer in decision making. At the gatekeeper phase, information is processed 
in terms of relevance to the organisation and includes three relevant 
variables: (1) perceived attributes of evolving innovation concepts, (2) 
established internal relationships and structures, and (3) ability to 
communicate new information. Two further variables include individual 
motivation and extraversion; both influence speed of flow but are beyond 
the scope of this study.  
By the first variable, gate keepers perceive new information through 
their individual value lens and organizational strategic values. To better 
understand the nature of the process we draw on two related concepts; 
firstly, Khurana’s and Rosenthal’s ‘holistic front end’; "This means 
understanding the link between business strategy and NPD, simultaneously 
considering the portfolio of product development efforts and objective 
assessment of the particular NPD opportunities” (1998, P.59). Secondly, 
Hambrick and Mason’s decision making model. In particular 2 constructs; 
the organisations ‘limited field of vision’ and individuals ‘cognitive base and 
values’. Limited filed of vision describes strategic areas to which attention is 
directed and bounded by existing organisation activity (1984, P.195). 
Cognitive base and values are individual ‘givens’ or assumptions. Together 
they situate or frame patterns for relevance to company and individual. In 
terms of this research the ‘field of vision’ guides initial search activity at the 
boundary phase and their cognitive base and values relate to an individuals 
cognitive styles, or information processing behaviours (for example 
analytical v non-analytical discussed later).  
By the second variable, the nature and strength of internal relationships 
determine flow effectiveness. In practical terms, this implies that an 
individual acquainted with a diverse set of individuals will be more likely to 
receive broad disciplinary feedback, which is known to promote innovation. 
Wider literature suggests innovation novelty and relevance suffers where 
such groups are myopic or dominated by a single capability (Zhou & Wu, 
2010). In light of this, human bias accentuates this negative as individuals 
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are more likely to share embryonic concepts within their immediate groups 
(Brentani & Reid, 2012). A further consequence of divisional boundaries and 
the grouping of disciplines, normal to organisations, i.e. engineering 
department, marketing department, finance department etc. Organisation 
structures may indeed be a prolific inhibitor of radical innovation with the 
following exceptions; where individuals are inclined to cross divisional 
boundaries (McDermott & O'Connor, 1999); where process promotes this to 
happen (Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998); or where breadth of knowledge is 
within the individual (Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998). In each case flow and 
quality of innovation concepts will improve.  
By the third variable, flow and quality of information is affected by the 
gatekeeper’s aptitude for communication. The provision of good context, 
linking technical and market applications speeds up the process of 
information sharing (Brentani & Reid, 2012).  
In sum, there are three implications for the research instrument; 
Firstly new information patterns are filtered through 3 legacy organisation 
elements; the overarching or gestalt strategy (Mintzberg, 1978), the portfolio 
of existing products, and the individual cognitive style. In order to isolate the 
individual’s cognitive style the research instrument must set out of the other 
two variables, the gestalt strategy and existing product portfolio. Appropriate 
measurement scale – Analytical v. non-analytical of which design thinking is 
one form. 
 
Secondly, a gatekeeper who seeks breadth of experience in sharing and 
validating opportunities is shown to enable innovation, whereas normal 
organisational divisions impede gatekeeping but are commonplace. The 
research instrument must determine normal organisation conditions in order 
to assess gatekeeper practices. Appropriate measurement scale - Narrow 
disciplinary focus v. broad disciplinary focus. As stated by Khuarna and 
Rosenthal, breadth may be within the individual or fostered by the process 
(1998). Therefore special consideration is necessary for individuals with 
breadth of knowledge.  
 
Thirdly, greater visibility between market and technology linkages facilitates 
radical innovation. The research instrument must set out conditions to 
evaluate the nature of communication mechanisms and their ability to 
communicate context across different innovation dimensions (4Ps). 
Appropriate measurement scale - Analytical v DT or other non-analytical. 
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Project phase variables 
The third and final phase is the point at which the project is officially 
accepted or rejected by central management. According to De Brentani and 
Reid process effectiveness at the project phase is dependent on a ‘project 
broker’, a position normally fulfilled by a senior manager. Here the broker 
prepares and introduces the idea for its formal screening, setting out its 
connection to current strategic context. Three key variables include; (1) 
existing organisation competencies, (2) new project decision criteria, and (3) 
speed through decision gate.  
By the first variable, radical projects may have competence destroying 
implications for the organisation and therefore be rejected. 
By the second variable, an organisation that presents rigid decision 
structures may slow or even kill a radical innovation, particularly where 
decision criteria are onerous. Good Broker navigation will speed up this 
process and flexible gates are recommended to allow brokers to champion 
and adapt decision criteria to something more relevant.  
By the third variable, early broker involvement ensures faster evolution 
of any innovation concept. Seniority of project broker brings with it 
experience and understanding in negotiating decision criteria particular to 
that organisation.  
In sum, there are two implications for the research instrument; 
Firstly, radical innovation is often competence destroying. This combined with 
formal decision criteria impedes fast decisions. The role of the Project broker 
is to prepare NPD proposal for formal decision gate and overcome barriers 
fast.  In doing so they must satisfy a number of conditions including meshing 
new opportunities within the current strategic web and work round ill-suited 
formal decision criteria. The research instrument must set out realistic 
organisation criteria for project approval and provide a radical innovation 
concept. By this we may isolate broker ingenuity and make visible their 
cognitive mechanisms for measurement. Here, we seek to record and 
measure both the communication tools adopted and broker emphasis in 
terms of targeted validation criteria and negotiation behaviours, overcoming 
problematic criteria. Appropriate measurement scale – analytic v. DT or other 
non-analytic approach.  
 
Secondly, delayed broker involvement is likely to delay project approval. The 
research instrument should determine at what point project broker (senior 
manager) involvement is sought. Appropriate measurement scale - initial 
instances of gatekeeping v. just prior to project decision gate 
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The initial problem space 
A key determinant of process initiation is the problem space in which it 
exists. Interestingly Sarasvathy deals with strategic choice under 
uncertainty. While this methodology follows Sarasvathy’s there are some 
notable differences. In particular, entrepreneurship deals with a pre-firm 
problem space, whereas we deal with a pre-innovation problem space. An 
entrepreneur does not inherit the benefits or burdens from firm history and 
as a result easier for the entrepreneur to impose personal values, goals & 
motivations in decision-making (D. Sarasvathy, 1997), whereas a boundary 
spanning individual acts within an organisation and is therefore bound by an 
extra organisational layer of influence. For purpose of framing this 
discussion we expand on the three elements of the pre-firm problem space; 
Knightian uncertainty, goal ambiguity, environmental isotropy (Saras D 
Sarasvathy, 2009) and include legacy organisation factors.  
Knightian uncertainty distinguishes between predictable futures and 
unpredictable futures. Faced with Knightian uncertainty it is impossible to 
calculate probabilities for future consequences. Two seminal theories 
characterise the unpredictable problem space; ‘artificial science’ (Simon, 
1985) and derivative concept of ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel, 1973).  
According to Simon artificial problems are solved by the logic of thought 
that is flexible to ever changing inputs, constraints and variables, whereas 
natural sciences asks for purely empirical data and facts and ordinary 
declarative reasoning to explain precise relationships (Simon, 1985, P.150). 
Artificial problems are creations of human intention and emotion bounded 
by natural laws;  
The world we live in is much more a man-made, or artificial, world 
than it is a natural world. Almost every element in our environment 
shows evidence of mans artifice. The temperature in which we spend 
most of our hours is kept at artificially at 20 degrees Celsius; the 
humidity is added or taken form the air we breadth; and the 
impurities we inhale are largely produced (and filtered) by man (cited 
in Saras D Sarasvathy, 2009, P.152). 
 ‘Wicked problems’ exist within the artificial sciences and describe a 
problematic juncture where goal formulation, problem definition and equity 
issues meet (Rittel, 1973). Strategic choice is implicated as follows; 
In a world of Newtonian order, where there is a clear relationship 
between cause and effect, companies can judge what strategies they 
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want to pursue. In a wicked world of complex and shadowy 
possibilities, enterprises don’t know if their strategies are appropriate 
or what those strategies’ consequences might be. They should 
therefore abandon the convention of thinking through all 
their options before choosing a single one, and experiment with 
a number of strategies that are feasible even if they are unsure of the 
implications. (Camillus, 2008, P.104) 
Secondly, an implication of an artificial problem space is ‘goal ambiguity’ 
and ‘environmental isotropy’. Upfront goals require conditions for 
prediction, in its absence goals are neither given nor well ordered. Here non-
predictive control replaces predictive control. In an infinite range of 
possibilities it is not clear what elements of the environment to pay 
attention to and what to ignore. Further to this, wicked problems are never 
truly solved but exist without a stopping rule. 
Most radical innovations are synthetic, man made creations, bounded by 
natural science but guided by human intention. At its initiation a radical 
innovation problem space exists along degrees of human intention. At its 
lowest, human intention is inconsequential and innovation arises from a 
technology breakthrough and carries no socio-cultural change. At its highest, 
human intention is significant, innovation is meaning driven and a new 
socio-cultural model results.  
In sum, an implication for the research instrument;  
Starting out, radical innovation possibilities are infinite, goal constraints are 
incomplete and environment signals are neither prioritised nor well ordered. 
Future conditions are not predictable. Two control factors simultaneously 
processed by individuals determine early goals; firstly organisational layer 
control and secondly individual cognitive style control. The research 
instrument must provide the environmental stimuli, characteristically 
ambiguous and isotropic, and organisational layer control conditions in order 
to isolate and observe the individual cognitive control styles. Appropriate 
measurement scale - Analytical v DT or other non-analytical. 
Cognitive styles in decision making: Analytical 
Thinking v. Non-analytical thinking  
Here we introduce literature on topics relevant to the actors in the 
process. We delineate a taxonomy of cognitive styles, distinguishing 
Analytical Thinking from Design Thinking. 
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Suitability of cognitive style is dependent on the nature of the problem 
space and existing organisation attributes. Analytical reasoning is useful in 
domains of clarity, where all variables are known to the decision maker and 
the future is predictable (Saras D Sarasvathy, et al., 2001). “According to the 
logic, once a problem is comprehensively stated the optimal solution can be 
rationally derived from the inner structure of the problem” (Lindberg, 
Gumienny, Jobst, & Meinel, 2010, P.244 drawing on Newel et. al 1967).  
Sarasvathy (2009) distinguishes two forms of analytical reasoning, 
deductive reasoning and Bayesian probability. Deductive reasoning deals 
with wholly objective issues and exemplifies the natural sciences, whereas 
Bayesian probability deals with subjective issues by means of rational 
methods. In this instance problem space uncertainties are transformed into 
factual statements so that it becomes susceptible to analytical techniques. 
Notably, both methods have different problem spaces at the start, one is to 
some degree subjective and while the other is wholly objective, but 
interestingly both adopt analytical reasoning tools in solving the problem 
space. 
Non-analytical is a catch all term we use to describe all approaches that 
do not fit analytical reasoning. Like Bayesian probability, non-analytical 
approaches address subjective issues, but unlike Bayesian probability the 
problem space is left uncertain while solving and non-analytical means are 
adopted. Effectuation is at least one known embodiment of this, described 
by Sarasvathy as the inverse of analytical processes. Others both good and 
bad include intuition, chaos, chance, magic, etc.   
For the purpose of analogy we draw on the introduction of the Nintendo 
Wii to the game console market to help distinguish between Analytical, 
Bayesian and Non-analytical (design thinking) cognitive styles in practice.  
At its inception the game console market was technology driven, focused 
on passive immersion in a virtual world (Verganti, 2009). Market share was 
won and lost by an organisations ability to deliver graphical realism. At this 
time one might declare the problem space as follows; Nerdy gamers need 
the latest technology. Moore’s law says every 2 years technology will have 
10 times the power currently available. Therefore we know gamers will 
expect 10 times better games.  
We hypothesise 3 different possible responses, analogous to 3 cognitive 
styles in practice:  
Analytical – From market truths we can deduce the level of improvement 
necessary. We can plan in advance the necessary steps for execution.  
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Bayesian – Xbox and Playstation have a technology advantage we cannot 
make up. We know that many people do not consume game consoles but we 
don’t know how many latent customers there are. By conducting surveys and 
reviewing market analytics we may predict the number and nature of 
potential customers. Based on this prediction we can define the exact 
solution.  
 
Design thinking – Xbox and Playstation have a technology advantage we 
cannot make up. It is reported that consumers cut back on game 
consumption as they start families. In our broad experience gaming is not 
very interactive when in the presence of other people and it focuses on a 
narrow set of technologies. What if we did something for the family? Let’s 
build a quick experimental model to see how they respond and learn from 
this. 
 
Possibly the key distinguishing element between analytical reasoning 
and non-analytical reasoning are their lines of inquiry. According to Bamford 
(2002) analytical process adopt an analysis/synthesis line of inquiry. Non-
analytical process adopts a conjecture/analysis line of inquiry. An 
analysis/syntheses model seeks absolute truth from the start. 
Conjecture/analysis draws on Popper’s pragmatic view of truth as ultimately 
a matter of professional agreement among scientists and only requires the 
appearance of truth. Here, relative truth is declared at the end of the 
process once proven satisfactory in a follow-up analysis. By Popperism, 
truthfulness and accuracy of a stating hypothesis doesn’t matter as it is 
ultimately unimportant to its resulting acceptance or rejection. In other 
words, if a guess is made and it is tested and found out to be good, then the 
outcome is accepted.  
In the case of radical innovation this releases future possibilities from the 
restrictive grip of declarative accuracy.  As not all methods of hypothesis 
construction are rationally definable it affords broader approaches to 
hypothesis creation. Analytical reasoning is conditioned on declarative 
statements drawn from historic patterns. 
This orientation of inquiry is further lived out in Sarasvathy’s distinction 
of analytical logic as predictive control v. effectual [non-analytical] logic of 
non-predictive control.  
In sum, there are a number of implications for a coding scheme:  
Evidence of analytical reasoning:  
1) An analysis/synthesis line of inquiry. 2) Subject defers design decisions in 
search of declarative statements. 3) The design solution is strictly modelled 
on historic patterns. 4) A prediction control mindset is apparent. 5) Subject 
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assigns all market influence to external firm factors. 
 
Evidence of non-analytical reasoning: 
1) A conjecture/analysis line of inquiry. 2) A non-predictive control mindset is 
apparent. 3) Subject believes in their ability to influence the market 
DT as a form of non-analytical reasoning 
Design literature firmly positions design cognitive styles with non-
analytical reasoning. Bousbaci (2008) distinguishes design thinking from 
classical scientific thinking by two dimensions, focus and outlook. He 
describes scientific thinking as a ‘problem focused’ approach, characterised 
by steadfast pursuit of the problem presented. Whereas design is described 
as a ‘solution focused’ approach, characterised by problem apathy, pursuing 
a quality solution to a problem not necessarily the one started with.  
Similarly, Schon and Buxton distinguish between ‘problem solving’ and 
‘problem setting’ (cited in Buxton, 2007, P.384), Buxton aligns analytical 
traits to problem solving expertise and design thinking traits to problem 
setting expertise. Schon distinguishes between scientific and design lines of 
inquiry. Science is convergent and depends on ‘agreement about ends’. 
Design practice is divergent and adopts non-technical process, framing 
problem situations where ‘there is yet no agreement about ends’(1991, 
P.41). Liedtka (2000) differentiates a design approach from traditional 
planning approach to strategy as being more widely participative; more 
dialogue based, issue-driven rather than calendar driven, conflict 
using rather than conflict-avoiding, where they all aim for invention and 
learning in place of control. According to Martin (2009) a reliability focus is 
consistent with analytical reasoning and perpetuating the past. A validity 
focus is consistent with exploration, innovation and design thinking.  
Van Aken (2004) distinguishes between ‘explanatory science’ and ‘design 
science’ along 3 dimensions, reputation systems, control rules and outlook. 
Explanatory science is characterised by an academic reputation system that 
rewards rigour whereas design science is characterised by a professional 
reputation system that rewards relevance. Explanatory science follows a 
quantitative recipe using algorithmic rules and evidence may be left out 
after it has been assessed, whereas design science follows heuristic rules 
based on variants of a design exemplar and evidence must remain part of 
the results. Explanatory science is description driven, seeks an 
understanding of phenomenon, whereas design science is prescription 
driven, designing of solutions in context.  
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In summary, there is a clear dichotomy between design thinking and 
analytical thinking. It needs to be noted however, we are not saying design 
professionals don’t practice analytical thinking, or scientists don’t practice 
design thinking. Rather any one individual will use different types of 
reasoning faced by different circumstances. We have simply isolated 
cognitive styles as the unit of analysis rather than the individual.  
In conclusion, design thinking is a form of non-analytical reasoning 
inverse to analytical thinking. It constitutes a distinct mode of reasoning 
based on an entirely separate logic. 
We summarise the key differences in the Table 1 below.  
Table 1 Analytical thinking v. Design thinking 
 Analytical thinking Design thinking 
Line of inquiry Problem focus Problem unbounded 
Problem solving Problem setting 
Convergent thinking Divergent thinking 
Reputation system Reliability  Validity 
Rigour Relevance 
Decision rules Algorithmic rules Heuristic rules 
Empirical validation of the research instrument 
framework 
For purpose of validating our theoretical assumptions of radical 
innovation process model and its environmental characteristics, we draw on 
a set of empirical interviews conducted in phase 1 of the larger study. 
Interviews focused on 3 innovation events within the recent history of 2 
organisations which are both experienced in radical innovation, and award 
winning industry leaders. 
We offer a summary of one innovation event captured in phase 1 and 
follow with a discussion on its similarities and contradictions with our 
theoretical model.  
This innovation event pertains to a device for the accurate detection of 
heat cycles in dairy cows: The total innovation episode from first cognitive 
trigger to product launch lasted for a total duration of 5 years, from 2003 
through 2008. We have identified the ESRI phase to have concluded in 2005. 
There after the project had NPD status. We locate the innovation event and 
its development sequence onto our theoretical model.  
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Starting environmental conditions 
Organisational layer - In 2003 the organisation was already a well 
established and a successful player in the dairy equipment market, in 
particular focused on the manufacture and supply of milking parlours to 
both Irish and international markets. It had good mechanical engineering 
resources but limited software capability.  
Market status – At this time an issue for detecting fertility in cows for 
dairy farmers existed and was known by the wider industry. Most farmers 
practiced fertility detection in cows by simple observation. Some basic 
technologies existed with limited accuracy. Technologies were based on 
step counting which required twice daily monitoring in order to check device 
display, normally practiced at milking time. Its detection method monitored 
a single symptom whereas human observation afforded multi-symptom 
checks. Technology to replicate human detection methods was not yet 
implemented.  
Boundary spanning events:  
There was clear evidence that this innovation process commenced from 
boundary spanner activity. At the start of the process the boundary spanner 
was cognisant of financial losses to the farmer experiencing poor fertility 
detection. He was particularly sensitive to the accuracy limitations of the 
current step counter technology on grass fed farms as against grain fed 
farms. In Ireland, most farms practice grass feeding and this magnified any 
deficiencies in step counters. The boundary spanner was sensitive to this as 
Ireland was the organisations home market. Here, the grass fed cow moves 
around more and is inconsistent in its daily movement, whereas the grain 
fed cow is less active because of corralling. A heat cycle brings about 
significant increase in general movement, this change is more sharply 
contrasted in the corralled cow and thus suited to step counting 
technologies.  
A point of breakthrough sparking the innovation cycle started when the 
passive awareness of the problem was stimulated by the new awareness of 
a technology breakthrough. The boundary spanner was active in reading 
technology journals and as a result triggered the first significant innovation 
event. An episode of pattern matching connected a technology 
breakthrough to the market need.  
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Gate keeping events:  
Next the boundary spanner turned gatekeeper, aware of the opportunity 
he started to informally discuss it with colleagues. The key breakthrough 
occurred on a flight to North America with an international sales manager. 
During the flight the opportunity was informally discussed and its market 
potential was affirmed by the second party. This moved the idea forward to 
a number of exploratory exercises coordinated by the gatekeeper.  
Project status approval:  
Over several informal meetings a plan of action was put into operation. A 
number of tasks were identified following gate keeping activities. Software 
and mechanical resources were engaged to develop a wearable housing to 
allow technology testing. Video analysis was conducted and correlated 
against digital readings. Algorithms were created to trace a number of 
symptoms and expose heat cycles. Following these steps the first complete 
offering was available for reliability testing in the field.  
At a second, later stage additional new resources were added indicating 
a further commitment to project, including the hiring of a dedicated sales 
person at which point the product was launched to market.  
Confirming radical innovation status:  
This product matured into a radical innovation satisfying 2 conditions; 
reaching non-customers of existing technologies, and affecting new 
competition rules for the industry. After two years on the market, 
unexpected demand came from animal breeding companies in place of 
farmers. The focus of sales channels shifted from milking equipment 
dealerships towards artificial insemination companies and by good 
performance they grew and expanded the market for fertility detection 
devices. Farming is now undergoing a change in meaning from manual 
farming methods to smart farming significantly led by technology 
improvements in wearable sensors. 
Implications for research instrument 
Our findings from preliminary interviews support the first two phases of 
process model, the boundary and gatekeeper stages. However, at the 
project interface the point of project approval, and thus end of ESRI process, 
is not clear. For example, in the case above some of the tasks were 
bootlegged, done under the impetus of one individual and it is not clear 
whether it was centrally approved or not. Interviewees revealed meetings 
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during the course of this innovation were rarely formal, instead undertaken 
without clear agenda items or written outcomes. More often instruction 
appeared to take the impetus of ‘do what you can when you can around 
your day to day responsibilities‘, rather than official time allocation even on 
reaching NPD status. This creates some ambiguity around the transition 
point from ‘project phase’ to NPD status. Activities and goals undertaken at 
this time equally resemble informal group engagement by a ‘project broker’ 
as official project team leadership.  
The case above is further complicated as the same individual played the 
role of Boundary Spanner, Gate Keeper and Project Broker who also 
happens to be a son of the owner. In summary, a problematic issue arises in 
clarifying the Project phase conclusion within SMEs. Pre-project approval 
activities and post-project approval activities may be hard to distinguish.  
In light of this problematic juncture we draw attention to retrospective 
interviews as a notable limitation, important details and nuances may be 
lost to poor memory recall. It is expected some of the difficulties faced here 
will be mitigated by the proposed think aloud research protocol as it 
concurrently reports on activities and offers more immediate verbalisation 
which is more accurate and detailed (Ericsson & Simon, 1980). In order to 
unequivocally resolve this, we recommend it is clarified between subject 
and interviewer before concluding the research experiment.  
Our findings support two key variables which bound the initial problem 
space. These recognise legacy organisation attributes, in particular existing 
markets and capabilities, and attributes of the individual, in particular their 
knowledge base be it of technology or market type. In an uncertain problem 
space an organisational layer bounds an employees thinking at the start. 
Khurana and Rosenthal’s ‘Holistic front end’ and Hambrick’s ‘field of vision’ 
offer theoretical grounds for measurement of both individual and 
organisational influences on cognition. Finally, this study supports the 
important and relevant issue of individual positioning in networks at the 
boundary spanning interface. For example, we know in the case above the 
individual participated in both academic technology networks and 
interfaced with end customers at trade shows. This, along with the 
individuals absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), proved a 
significant driver in the resulting radical innovation outcome  
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Conclusions  
In conclusion, this study sets out a novel experimental protocol and 
framework for future investigation of design thinking and early stage radical 
innovation by contributing three elements. It empirically supports a process 
model for radical innovation. Secondly, it characterises the environment of 
the radical innovation problem space. Thirdly, it offers a taxonomy of 
cognitive behaviours to be observed in ESRI. 
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